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The EU and Japan are important economic partners. They have been negotiating a 
bilateral free trade agreement since 2013. Both sides could benefit from this. More 
important than the potential GDP increase, however, would be the strategic value of 
such an agreement. In this era of Brexit and Trump, it would signal a clear 
commitment to economic cooperation and free trade. 
 
 
 
Electro-mobility, robots, computers – there are 
many fields in which Japan is regarded as one of 
the most innovative countries in the world. At the 
same time, the country’s economy is facing 
significant challenges: an aging society, high 
government debt and stagnating growth. The 
Japanese government’s reform program (known 
as “Abenomics”) wants to inject new impetus into 
the economy by negotiating free trade 
agreements (FTAs), among other things. 
 
The EU and Japan are currently negotiating an 
FTA and are striving to complete the negotiations 
quickly, possibly even before the end of 2017. 
Japan is the EU's sixth-largest trade partner, 
while the EU is the third most important for 
Japan. The trade volume between the two 
countries amounted to around EUR 125 billion in 
2016. Yet there is still potential for that to 
increase, given that trade barriers persist on both 
sides. An FTA could further reduce duties and 
non-tariff barriers and have positive economic 
effects for both sides.  
 
Background and the current state 
of negotiations 
 
The EU and Japan have long-standing close 
economic ties, which are supported by a score of 
formal and informal agreements and 
opportunities for dialogue. Since 2004, for 
example, a Cooperation Framework has been in 
place to promote bilateral investment. Programs 
such as the Executive Training Programme and 
the EU Gateway Programme, which are intended 
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to support European companies entering the 
Japanese market, have been in place since the 
1980s. The EU-Japan Business Round Table, 
which was set up in 1999, facilitates direct 
interaction between Japanese and European 
companies. 
 
At the EU-Japan summit in 2011, these two 
economic partners agreed to work on a new 
framework for bilateral relations and analyze the 
potential for an FTA. In November 2012, 
following a thorough examination, the EU 
Council authorized the European Commission to 
open negotiations for an FTA between the EU 
and Japan. Negotiations were officially started in 
March 2013. The first round of talks took place in 
April 2013 in Brussels. To date, there have been 
17 rounds in total, with the most recent round 
taking place in September 2016, also in 
Brussels. 
 
From the Europeans' point of view, the greatest 
challenges lie in the fields of agriculture, food, 
rail transport equipment, designations of origin 
and non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs). In these 
areas, the EU is expecting clear concessions 
from the Japanese side. Japan, on the other 
hand, has identified its priorities as being the 
automobile industry, in which the country still 
faces tariffs of ten per cent from the EU, along 
with a whole series of NTBs, such as EU rules 
on bottling soft drinks, where the quantities 
permitted per bottle do not always correspond 
with those in Japan. In public procurement, for 
example market access to the rail transport 
sector, there continues to be a wide gap between 
positions on both sides. E-Commerce, free data 
flow and the investment court proposed by the 
EU are other areas of disagreement. 
 
Global political developments, in particular in 
relation to Donald Trump’s election as the 45th 
US President in November 2016, have recently 
given the negotiations new momentum. Despite 
this, they could not be completed by the end of 
2016 as was originally intended, since quick 
agreement on the aforementioned issues did not 
prove possible. What is more, following the 
USA’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), Japan is taking a more 
hesitant approach to the rest of its trade policy 
agenda.  
 
In February 2017, the EU Commissioner for 
Trade, Cecilia Malmström, and the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Fumio Kishida, confirmed both 
sides’ intention of bringing negotiations to a 
conclusion as quickly as possible. However, no 
firm date has been set for the 18th round of talks, 
which suggests that both sides still need to 
clarify how they wish to proceed. 
 
Only an ambitious agreement will 
lead to significant effects 
 
A glance at the economic impact of a free trade 
agreement between the EU and Japan shows 
that it would vary wildly, depending on the 
scenario. Calculations by the Munich-based ifo 
Institute for Economic Research on behalf of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung concluded that strong 
impetus for economic growth on both sides could 
only be expected if an ambitious agreement is 
concluded that sets about significantly reducing 
non-tariff barriers. Under a conservative 
scenario, which is politically more likely, similar in 
form to the free trade agreement between the EU 
and South Korea which came into effect in 2011, 
the economic effect is much more modest and 
for some EU member states, only marginal.  
Below we go into more detail on both scenarios 
and their effects on economic output, foreign 
trade and at sectoral level. The effects are long 
term, meaning that they would only be observed 
after the free trade agreement had been in force 
for around 10-12 years. The base year for the 
calculations is 2014. 
 
Conservative scenario similar in form to the 
EU-South Korea agreement 
 
The conservative scenario could see Japan 
increase its economic output, as measured by 
gross domestic product (GDP), by approximately 
EUR 9 billion a year. That is equivalent to 0.23 
per cent of Japanese GDP in 2014, the base 
year for the model calculations in the 
corresponding study. For the EU, GDP growth 
would amount to some EUR 11 billion, around 
0.1 per cent of its GDP for 2014. The benefit to 
individual member states would vary 
significantly. Germany would see the highest 
additional growth in absolute terms, at EUR 3.4 
billion, or around 0.11 per cent. 
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But for some southern and eastern European 
countries such as Greece or Romania, the 
growth effects would amount to a rather 
negligible 0.02 per cent. That said, no EU 
member state would be adversely affected 
overall by a trade agreement between the EU 
and Japan. Certain third countries such as China 
(–0.012 per cent), South Korea (-0.018) or 
Taiwan (–0.025) would experience negative  
 
effects, but these figures are so minor that they 
are not statistically significant. 
 
Trade between Japan and the EU could be 
increased via the free trade agreement. Exports 
between the partners would increase tangibly on 
both sides. Of the EU member states, the ones 
that would benefit most would be Spain (+88.2 
per cent), Greece (+79.9 per cent) and Belgium 
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(+75.1 per cent). Germany would be in fifth 
place, with its exports to Japan increasing by 
some 72 per cent. The effects on imports would 
be less pronounced. Japan’s imports from the 
EU would increase by some 61 per cent, and 
imports to the EU from Japan by around 55 per 
cent. The highest increases in imports from 
Japan would occur in Greece (66.1 per cent), 
Slovakia (64.6 per cent) and Bulgaria (60.9 per 
cent). Germany would lie in fifth place once 
more, at 59.7 per cent. 
 
At sectoral level, it is possible to identify winners 
and losers. In Japan, pharmaceutical products (–
5 per cent), wholesale trade (–0.42 per cent) and 
food (–0.16 per cent) can expect a drop in 
output. In these sectors, EU companies are 
formidable competitors. Meanwhile, in the EU, it 
would be machines and equipment (–0.2 per 
cent) as well as services in the areas of 
programming and legal advice (-0.04 per cent 
each) that would be affected. By contrast, 
manufacturing sectors would benefit in both 
Japan and the EU: in Japan’s case computer 
and electronics in particular (+4.4 per cent), 
mechanical engineering (+1.63 per cent) and 
automotive (+1.47 per cent). In the EU, the 
highest growth for output in manufacturing would 
be apparent in Germany (+2.5 per cent), France 
(+1.9 per cent) and the United Kingdom (+1.5 
per cent). That said, eastern European countries 
such as Poland would experience slight drops in 
output for this sector, as it is possible that some 
EU member states would then source their 
industrial intermediate goods from Japan. In both 
Japan and the EU, particularly Germany and the 
United Kingdom, the service sector would 
especially benefit from a reduction in non-tariff 
trade barriers. 
 
Under the conservative scenario, the economic 
impact for both sides would be relatively minor 
overall. This shows that the extent to which non-
tariff barriers are removed plays a key role in 
how much potential growth the free trade 
agreement between the EU and Japan could 
generate. 
 
 
 
 
Ambitious scenario: Greater reduction in 
non-tariff trade barriers 
 
An ambitious free trade agreement between the 
EU and Japan would reduce the non-tariff trade 
barriers between the participating countries to a 
level similar to the average of all existing free 
trade agreements. The reduction would therefore 
be significantly greater than that resulting from 
the agreement between the EU and South 
Korea. If an ambitious agreement were to be 
achieved, Japan’s GDP would be some 1.6 per 
cent higher year than it would be without the 
agreement. In the EU, the effects would range 
from 0.1 per cent (e.g. Greece and Romania) to 
1.4 per cent for Ireland. Germany, meanwhile, 
could still expect an increase in GDP by 0.7 per 
cent – around EUR 20 billion. 
 
Under an ambitious scenario, trade between 
Japan and the EU would receive a strong boost. 
On average, EU exports to Japan could see an 
increase of 146 per cent. The figures would vary 
greatly for the individual member states. Cyprus 
(+214 per cent), Luxembourg (+187 per cent) 
and the United Kingdom (+176 per cent) would 
benefit most. Germany’s exports to Japan would 
increase by 167 per cent, placing the country in 
fifth position. Croatia would benefit the least, with 
an increase of 87 per cent.  
 
Under the ambitious scenario, the impact on 
imports would be somewhat greater than for 
exports. The EU average increase for imports 
from Japan would be 162 per cent. The highest 
increases would be seen for Luxembourg (191 
per cent), Ireland (185 per cent) and the 
Netherlands (178 per cent). Germany would lie in 
sixth place, with 169 per cent. Compared to 
exports, there is much less variation between the 
EU member states. With 129 per cent, Latvia 
shows the smallest increase in Japanese 
imports. 
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A quick detour: EU, Japan and Brexit 
 
The United Kingdom has decided to leave the EU. If Brexit does become a reality, a free trade 
agreement between the EU and Japan would not apply to the UK. We have followed up on this 
line of thought in a separate scenario. This is based on the assumption that there would be a hard 
Brexit, whereby the EU and the UK would reintroduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers would increase 
to the level observed between other WTO members. The results show that it makes no difference 
to the EU whether the UK were to be party to an EU-Japan agreement or not (conservative 
scenario only): the percentage change in GDP would be zero on average for the EU 27. Brexit 
would mean a slight reduction in the value of the agreement to Japan. However, with a difference 
of 0.03 percentage points in the change to GDP, this loss in value is also marginal. This means 
that Brexit would have a negligible impact on a conservative free trade agreement between the EU 
and Japan. It would be the UK itself which would suffer the highest losses in comparison to the 
other EU member states: as a non-member state, its GDP growth generated by the FTA between 
the EU and Japan would be 0.06 percentage points lower than it would be without Brexit. 
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Under the ambitious scenario, there are clear 
sectoral winners and losers. The breakdown 
does not differ significantly from that under the 
first scenario, but the size of the gains or losses 
certainly do. In Japan, the highest percentage 
losses in output would once again arise for 
pharmaceutical products (–31.7 per cent) and 
wholesale trade (–5.5 per cent). In the EU 
machines and equipment (–3.15 per cent) and 
electronics (–0.75) would be most severely 
affected. Manufacturing would especially benefit 
in Japan, in particular mechanical engineering 
(+28.9 per cent) and computers and electronics 
(+21.8 per cent). In the EU, the highest growth 
would be in pharmaceutical products (+10.5 per 
cent) and wholesale trade (+1.89 per cent), 
mirroring losses in these sectors in Japan.  
Under the ambitious scenario, the economic 
impact is many times greater than it would be 
under the conservative scenario. Whether such 
an ambitious free trade agreement between the 
EU and Japan is even on the table, depends 
predominantly on whether there is the political 
will on both sides. Here there would be a need 
on both sides for significantly greater 
concessions than the conservative agreement 
would require. However, the calculations show 
that such concessions would pay off – in 
economic terms at least. 
 
Countering Trumponomics: The 
strategic value of an FTA between 
the EU and Japan 
 
Above and beyond the economic impact, which 
depending on the scenario may turn out to be 
rather moderate, the strategic component of an 
agreement between two of the world’s largest 
economic powers should not be underestimated. 
This applies to an even greater extent in light of 
recent political developments. With Donald 
Trump and his “America First” policy, there is a 
president in the White House who is prepared to 
turn his back on the global economic order that 
the USA itself helped to build after the Second 
World War. This process included promoting 
world trade by reducing tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers on the one hand, and avoiding 
protectionist measures which could lead to the 
outbreak of a trade war on the other hand. In the 
20th century, the negotiation of bilateral FTAs 
and finally the establishment of the WTO were 
important steps in achieving these aims.  
In the 21st century, the following scenario would 
have been conceivable for the future trade order: 
the USA and EU would set the tone for trade 
relations between industrialized countries with 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), while the TPP, covering 
twelve member states including the USA and 
Japan, but not China, would set new standards 
for mixed agreements between industrialized 
countries and developing or emerging 
economies.  
 
These negotiations would not only be limited to 
technical standards, but would extend to labor, 
social and environmental standards, too. The 
latter in particular play an important role in 
international trade, in order to avoid a “race to 
the bottom” – the steady erosion of such 
standards in favor of economic profits. In addition 
to this “western” trade agreement, the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
would probably be concluded in Asia, which 
could probably set comparatively lower 
standards.  
 
RCEP was launched by the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), however as a 
member, China plays a central role in the 
negotiations. Of the aforementioned agreements, 
RCEP has become the only one with a realistic 
chance of actually becoming a reality in the near 
future. One of President Trump’s first acts upon 
taking up office was to withdraw the USA from 
the TPP, which had not yet been ratified. This 
could also cause the TTIP, the negotiations for 
which have already been difficult, to grind to a 
halt. There has never been quite such a question 
mark hanging over the future of the world trade 
order as there is right now, especially given that 
advocates of protectionism have been gaining 
ground worldwide. 
 
The USA’s withdrawal from TPP was a shock for 
Japan, since the country had invested high 
hopes in the agreement, seeing it as a 
counterweight to regional rival China, which is 
not a member. This means that Japan faces a 
similar situation as the EU does over TTIP. 
Traditionally, the USA has been the EU’s most 
important partner in international political and 
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economic cooperation. TTIP was to be a 
crowning touch to this relationship, which has 
grown close over the years. However, under 
President Trump, the USA appears to no longer 
be a reliable partner for world trade – neither for 
the EU nor for Japan. This is not only true for 
trade issues, but also for many other policy 
areas. In order to fill this vacuum, both Japan 
and the EU will need new allies as they move 
into the Trump era. 
It therefore makes sense to strengthen the 
European-Japanese relationship through this 
FTA, not least since the EU is already focusing 
more in the direction of Asia, for example 
through its agreement with Singapore (not yet 
ratified) and South Korea (in force). An FTA 
signed in the near future between the EU and the 
second biggest Asian economy would therefore 
send an important political signal to other Asian 
countries: while the USA is pulling out, the EU is 
strengthening its commitment and continuing to 
show its Asian partners that there are still 
alternatives to China. From a Japanese point of 
view too, it would therefore be good news if the 
EU were to strengthen its position as a western 
economic power in Asia, rather than leaving the 
field to China.  
In the world trade order, the FTA between the 
EU and Japan would strike a radically different 
note compared to “Trumponomics”. It would 
show that two of the largest global economic 
powers are continuing on a course of economic 
integration and cooperation, and are working 
together to reduce protectionist measures. 
 
Outlook 
 
An FTA between the EU and Japan would bring 
positive economic effects for both sides. More 
important than the potential GDP increase, 
however, would be the strategic value of such an 
agreement. In times of economic disintegration 
and rising protectionism, this would signal a clear 
commitment to economic cooperation and free 
trade. Furthermore, the agreement could serve 
as a first step towards filling the vacuum in the 
world trade order created by the USA and its 
rejection of free trade.  
 
However, both the EU and Japan should act 
quickly and try to actually complete the 
negotiations before the year is out. Japan should 
not allow itself to be thrown off balance by the 
USA’s withdrawal from TPP, and should allow 
caution to prevail in any potential negotiations for 
a bilateral agreement with the USA. Japan too 
can only lose under Trump’s “America First” 
policy.  
Furthermore, neither Japan nor the EU should 
forget that China has already positioned itself – 
both at the G20 Summit in Hangzhou 2016 and 
the World Economic Forum in Davos at the 
beginning of 2017 – to have more say in the 
international free trade regime in future, and to 
set its own standards (for example, within the 
RCEP). This development may not be in either 
European or Japanese interests. 
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